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I. INTRODUCTION
George Taylor is reported to have called the strike "the motive power
for agreement" in collective bargaining in the private sector.' The
committee he chaired, whose recommendations led to enactment of the
statute that bears his name, similarly recognized that "the right to strike
remains as an integral part of the collective bargaining process in the
private enterprise sector," 2 and that-public sector union officials
maintained that eliminating the ban on public employee strikes would lead
to meaningful negotiations, thereby reducing strikes. 3 Nevertheless, the
committee flatly declared that "[t]he strike cannot be a part of the
negotiating process." 4
Indeed, the governor created the Taylor Committee and the state
enacted the Taylor Law in recognition of the failure of the predecessor
statute, the Condon-Wadlin Act, to prevent strikes by public employees
in New York.5 The committee concluded that the most effective way to
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Gerlenter, William Herbert, Ann Hodges, Joseph Slater and Alaine Williams. I thank Kevin Flanigan
of NYPERB for providing me with PERB-maintained data on strikes in New York and William Gross
of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation for providing me with Bureau-maintained data on strikes
under Pennsylvania Act 195. I also thank Chicago-Kent Reference Librarian Mandy Lee for excellent
research assistance.
1. See NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 & n.14 (1960); IRVING RICHTER,
LABOR'S STRUGGLES, 1945-1950: A PARTICIPANT'S VIEw 52-53 (1994).
2. STATE OF NEW YORK, GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS,
FINAL REPORT 15 (1966) [hereinafter TAYLOR COMMITTEE REPORT].

3. Id. at 19.
4. Id. at 16; see also id at 42 ("We are convinced that the strike must not be used in the field
of government service."). There is evidence that George Taylor and committee members David Cole
and John Dunlop previously favored a right to strike for some public employees but the committee
was driven to its absolutist position by political considerations. See RONALD DONOVAN,
ADMINISTERING THE TAYLOR LAW: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN NEW YORK 29-31 (1990).
5. TAYLOR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (The governor charged the committee "to

make legislative proposals for protecting the public against the disruption of vital public services by
illegal strikes, while at the same time protecting the rights of public employees.").
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prevent strikes was to enact legislation providing for the orderly
recognition of employee collective representatives, and an obligation on
the part of the government employer to bargain in good faith with the
recognized representative. 6 It reasoned that strikes in violation of the
Condon-Wadlin Act, were "often caused by a feeling of futility on the part
of public employees because of the absence of other means by which they
could participate in the determination of the terms and conditions of their
employment." 7
But if the "motive power for agreement" relied on in the private
sector was to be prohibited in the public sector, what force or forces would
take its place? This paper examines the evolution of the motive power in
public sector collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and compares it
to the motive power in five other states, including three where public
employees have a right to strike. It analyzes the policy concerns and
trade-offs presented by the different approaches.
II. THE MOTIVE POWER IN NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING

A. From Condon-Wadlin to Taylor
New York enacted the Condon-Wadlin Act in 1947, the same year
that Congress enacted, over President Truman's veto, the Taft-Hartley
Act.8 The immediate precipitator of the Condon-Wadlin Act was a weeklong strike by teachers in Buffalo.9 The statute prohibited strikes by
public employees and backed the prohibition with severe penalties,
including immediate termination of strikers who, if they were reinstated,
were ineligible for pay increases for three years and were on probation for
five years.10 The penalties were so draconian that they were rarely
enforced." Through 1964, the law was invoked in only seven out of
twenty-one strikes and only a total of eighteen employees were
discharged. 12 In 1963, the legislature amended the statute, reducing the

6.
7.
8.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 42.
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

9.

See DONOVAN, supra note 4, at 3-4; Stuart R. Wolk, Public Employee Strike-A Survey of

§ 141-197

(2012).

the Condon- Wadlin Acts, 13 N. Y. L. F. 69, 70 (1967); Jason A. Zwara, Left in the Dark: How New
York's Taylor Law Impairs Collective Bargaining,31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 193, 195 (2013).
10. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 108(4)-(5) (McKinney 1959).
11. Zwara supra note 9, at 195.
12. Mildred Warner, New York State Taylor Law: History, RESTRUCTURING LO. GOV'T,
http://www.mildredwamer.org/gov-restructuring/special-projects/taylor-law (last visited Apr. 17,
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disqualification period for pay raises to six months and the probation
period to one year but adding a fine of two days' pay for every day on
strike.1 3 The amendment expired by its own terms two years later.14
The Condon-Wadlin Act's ineffectiveness was on display in 1965
when 6,000 Department of Welfare workers struck for twenty-eight days
and, as part of the settlement, all strike penalties were waived.' 5 On
January 1, 1966, New York City Transit workers struck for twelve days,
costing the city's economy $100 million per day.' 6 As part of the
settlement, the state legislature passed an amnesty law waiving all strike
Three days later, the governor appointed the Taylor
penalties.' 7
Committee.' 8

'

The committee recommended that a process be developed,
administered by a new agency.to be established, to ensure employees the
right to be represented for collective negotiations with their employer.' 9
As discussed above, the committee emphatically rejected allowing public
employees to strike.2 0 It recognized that to guard against strikes, a
substitute must be provided for resolution of bargaining impasses.2
Reflecting back on the committee's recommendations, George Taylor
wrote:
A strike prohibition in public employment should be
effective if ways and means other than the strike are
available to insure a fair and equitable disposition of
employee claims. We know from experience that finding
a substitute for the strike is the formula successfully
followed in other situations in which the work stoppage
method of settling differences gave unsatisfactory
results.2 2
2019); see also Zwara, supra note 8, at 195 (observing that public employers regularly waived the
penalties). Enforcement was also inconsistent, with upstate Republicans enforcing Condon-Wadlin
against weak unions and no enforcement against unions that were large and powerful. See DONOVAN,
supra note 4, at 7.
13. Warner, supra note 12; Zwara, supra note 9, at 195 n.15.
14. See Zwara supra note 9 at 196.
15. Warner, supra note 12.

16.

Id.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See DONOVAN, supra note 4, at 19-20, 23; Zwara, supra note 9, at 196.
Zwara, supra note 9, at 196.
TAYLOR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-8.
See discussion supra note 4 and accompanying text.
TAYLOR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-8.

22. George W. Taylor, Strikes in PublicEmployment, GOOD Gov., Spring 1968, at 9, 13.
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The Taylor Committee considered and rejected interest arbitration as
the strike substitute.2 3 The committee reasoned that mandating interest
arbitration would chill collective negotiations, encouraging parties to take
extreme positions, leaving it to the arbitrator to impose terms.24 The
committee also doubted the legality of mandated interest arbitration
"because of the obligation of the designated executive heads of
government departments or agencies not to delegate certain fiscal and
other duties."25
Instead, the committee proposed that if the parties had not reached
agreement sixty days prior to the employer's budget submission date, the
Public Employment Relations Board ("PERB"), upon finding that the
parties are at impasse would assist the parties with mediation. 26 if
mediation did not result in agreement, PERB would appoint a factfinding
board of three neutrals who would make recommendations for settlement
within fifteen days of the budget submission date. 2 7 The committee was
optimistic that the factfinding process itself would often lead to
agreement:
Fact-finding requires the parties to gather objective
information and to present arguments with reference to
these data. An unsubstantiated or extreme demand from
either party tends to lose its force and status in this forum.
The fact-finding report and recommendations provide a
basis to inform and to crystalize thoughtful public
opinion and move media comment.28
However, if factfinding did not lead to voluntary agreement, in
keeping with democratic principles of legislative supremacy, the
committee urged that final resolution of the matter should rest with the
employer's legislative body. 29 The committee recommended that if either
party rejected the factfinding recommendations, the employer's
legislative body hold a public hearing at which the parties would be

23.

TAYLOR COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 37-38, 46.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 36-37.
Id.
Id at 37.
Id. at 38.
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afforded the opportunity to show cause as to why the recommendations
should not be adopted. 3 0 The ultimate resolution would be made by the
legislative body.3 1
As initially enacted, the Taylor Law did not provide for legislative
resolution of impasses that remained after factfinding.3 2 That was
changed by amendments in 1969.33 When the dust settled, the motive
power for collective bargaining under the Taylor Law was mediation,
factfinding and legislative determination.34 The statute provides for
PERB to appoint a mediator upon a finding that the parties are at
impasse.35 If impasse continues, PERB appoints a factfinding board of up
to three members who must render recommendations for resolution eighty
days before the end of the employer's fiscal year, which are made public
five days later. 36 Section 209(3)(e) provides:
[S]hould either the public employer or the employee
organization not accept in whole or in part the
recommendations of the fact-finding board, (i) the chief
executive officer of the government involved shall,
within ten days after receipt of the findings of fact and
recommendations of the fact-finding board, submit to the
legislative body of the government involved a copy of the
findings of fact and recommendations of the fact-finding
board, together with his recommendations for settling the
dispute; (ii) the employee organization may submit to
such legislative body its recommendations for settling the
dispute; (iii) the legislative body or a duly authorized
committee thereof shall forthwith conduct a public
hearing at which the parties shall be required to explain
their positions with respect to the report of the factfinding board; and (iv) thereafter, the legislative body
shall take such action as it deems to be in the public
30. Id. at 38-39.
3 1. Id. at 39.
32. See Zwara, supra note 9, at 199.
In 1974, educational institutions were exempted from the legislative
33. Id. at 201.
determination provision, and law enforcement and fire personnel were-provided with compulsory
Events,
PERB.NY.GOV.,
of
Notable
PERB,
Timeline
arbitration.
NY
interest

http://perb.ny.gov/timeline.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
34.

See Zwara, supra note 9, at 201.

35. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW.
36. Id § 209(3)(b)-(c).

§ 209(3)(a)

(McKinney 2018).
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interest, including the interest of the public employees
involved.37
These procedures are coupled with strong penalties for illegal
strikes.38
The most significant penalties are the bargaining
representative's loss of dues checkoff,39 and the penalizing of striking
employees two days' pay for each day on strike, collected by the
employer. 4 0 Unlike the Condon-Wadlin Act, the Taylor Law's strike
penalties have been imposed after most of the strikes since the law was
enacted. 4 1 The harsh penalties may be counterproductive. In at least one
instance, the loss of dues checkoff so severely interfered with the union's
ability to carry out its representational duties that PERB removed it.4 2 The
two-for-one penalty imposed on striking employees exacerbates tensions
which were already high enough to motivate workers to strike in the face
of such strong deterrents.43 In a study published in 1981, Craig Olson and
colleagues concluded that the Taylor Law's strike penalties shifted the
parties' strike costs so dramatically that unions generally had no choice
but to concede to the employer because of the union's strong need to avoid
a strike.4 4 However, the motive power in New York public employee
collective bargaining has evolved significantly since then.
B. The TriboroughDoctrine and the Evolution of the Motive Power
in New York Public Employee Collective Bargaining
In 1972, PERB decided TriboroughBridge and Tunnel Authority.4 5
PERB held that the employer breached its duty to bargain in good faith

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. § 209(3)(e).
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW.
See id. § 210(3)(a).
Id. § 210(2)(f).

§ 210(2)(a)

(McKinney, 2018).

41. See Robert F. Worth, The Transit Showdown: The Taylor Law; A Powerful Tool to Use
Against Striking Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/
13/nyregion/transit-showdown-taylor-law-powerful-tool-use-against-striking-employees.html.
In
2005, the United Federation of Teachers reported that unions lost dues check-off in two-thirds of the
strikes conducted since 1967 and employees suffered the two-for-one penalty in 80 percent of strikes
since 1969. Deidre McFadyen, The History of the Taylor Law: How Teacher Strikes Became Illegal,
N.Y. TCHR. NEWSPAPER (June 9, 2005), http://www.uft.org/labor-spotlight/history-taylor-law.

42.

United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2, 15 NYPERB

¶ 3091

(1982).

43. See Zwara, supra note 9, at 234.
44. CRAIG A. OLSON ET AL., STRIKES AND STRIKE PENALTIES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: FINAL
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR 129 (1981).

45.

Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 5 NYPERB

¶ 3037 (1972).
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when it discontinued paying seniority-based wage increases after the
collective bargaining agreement providing for such increases expired.4 6
Whereas in the private sector, an employer may make unilateral changes
in mandatory subjects of bargaining after bargaining has reached
impasse,47 PERB reasoned that under the Taylor Law, the union may not
respond to such changes with a strike and thus is at a systematic
disadvantage.4 8 Consequently, PERB held that an employer commits an
improper practice if it "unilaterally alter[s] existing mandatory subjects of
negotiations while a successor agreement is being negotiated.'A9 PERB
subsequently held that if the union engages in an illegal strike, the
employer may make unilateral changes.so PERB reasoned that because
the prohibition on unilateral employer action was intended to offset the
disadvantage the union is under by not being allowed to strike, "only
employees who do not strike are entitled to the maintenance of the status
quo during negotiations."
The New York Court of Appeals considered the Triboroughdoctrine
in Board of CooperativeEducationalServices v. PERB.5 2 The court held
that the rationale for the general Triborough rule did not apply to step
increases after the contract has expired, reasoning that "it should not apply
where the employer maintains the salaries in effect at the expiration of the
contract but does not pay increments." 5 3
Unions reacted to the court's decision by advocating for amendments
to the Taylor Law.5 4 Unions maintained that after the court's decision,
employers were prolonging negotiations to pressure employees and
unions, and to rid themselves of provisions in the expired contract that did
not concern mandatory subjects of bargaining. 5 In 1978 and 1979, the
legislature passed bills that would have made it an improper practice for
an employer "to refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement
until a new agreement is negotiated," but the governor vetoed the bills.5 6

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 5 NYPERB ¶ 3037 (1972).
Id.
Vill. of Valley Stream, 6 NYPERB ¶ 3076 (1973).

51.

Id. at 312. See Mary Helen Moses, Scope of Bargainingand the Triborough Law: New

York's Collective BargainingDilemma, 56 ALBANY L. REV. 53, 77-81 (1992).
52. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. NYPERB, 363 N.E.2d 1174, 1175-78 (N.Y. 1977).
53. Id. at 1177.
54.

See Moses, supra note 51, at 82.

55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 83.
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In 1982, however, the governor signed such a bill.57 In an extraordinary
session of the legislature in December 1982, an exception was added
specifying that the provision did not apply if the union engaged in a
strike. 8 Thus, current Section 209 a-1(e) makes it an improper practice
for an employer to:
refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement
until a new agreement is negotiated, unless the
employee organization which is a party to such
agreement has, during such negotiations or prior to such
resolution of such negotiations, engaged in conduct
violative of subdivision one of section two hundred ten
of this article [i.e. engaged in a strike].s9
This provision is often referred to as the "Triborough Law." 6 0
Unlike the original Triborough decision which froze the status quo
with respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining,6 1 the Triborough Law
freezes the status quo with respect to all provisions in the expired contract,
including permissive subjects of bargaining. 62 Moreover, the Appellate
Division has held that when the employer's legislature is presented with
a bargaining impasse after rejection of factfinding recommendations, it
may not "impose a settlement which diminishes employee rights under an
expired collective bargaining agreement." 63 Although PERB has held that
a umon waives this protection to the extent that it opts to participate in the
legislative process,6 4 there is little incentive for a union to do so. The
Taylor Law appears to provide a significant incentive for a union to refrain
from striking. As long as it does not strike, the Union is able to maintain
the freeze on the status quo. Indeed, defenders of the Triborough Law
point to a substantial decrease in the incidence of strikes since its
enactment.6 5 Figure 1, provided by PERB, shows a dramatic decline in

57. Id.
58. Id. at 83-84.
59. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209a-l(e) (McKinney 2018).
60. See Unif. Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562 v. Cuevas, 714 N.Y.S.2d 802, 806 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000).
61. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 5 NYPERB 3037 (1972).
62. See Cuevas, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
63. See County of Niagra v. Newman, 481 N.Y.S.2d 563, 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
64. See City of Buffalo, 19 NYPERB T 3023 (1986).
65. See, e.g., Richard E. Casagrande & Deborah Milham, Why We Defend Triborough,NYSUT
UNITED (Feb.18, 2011), https://www.nysut.org/news/nysut-united/issues/201 1/march-201 1/why-we-

131

THE MOTIVE POWER

2018]

strike activity under the Triborough Law.
Figure 1: Strikes Under the Taylor Law
Year

Number of
Strikes

Year

Number of
Strikes

1967
1968

2

1992

26

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

11
31
22
27
17
17

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

2
2
3

33
15
16
18
21
23
16

3
0
2
1
2
1

0
0
4
0

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

0
0
0
0
1
2
1
2
0

0
1

0
0

0
0
0

0
0
1
0

0
0

It is clear that since the Triborough Law, the motive power in New
York public sector collective bargaining is the frozen status quo coupled
with a heavy dose of mediation by PERB. The urgency that would be
provided by a strike deadline is not present and even the lesser urgency
that might be provided by a pending interest arbitration or a legislative
defend-triborough.
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resolution hearing does not exist. Of course, there are tools that skillful
mediators may employ to deal with this. 6 6 Nevertheless, bargaining under
this model is likely to be prolonged with substantial periods where the
parties have no contract. Perhaps the poster child for this is the Buffalo
teachers who went twelve years without a contract.6 7
As it has evolved, the Taylor Law may be comparable to the Railway
Labor Act ("RLA").68 Although the RLA recognizes workers' right to
strike, it lists as its first purpose "avoid[ing] any interruption to commerce
or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein." 69 At any time after a
party serves notice on the other party of a desire to modify the collective
bargaining agreement, either party may request the National Mediation
Board ("NMB") to appoint a mediator.70 The parties then are under a duty
to maintain the status quo - the union may not strike and the employer
may not change any terms and conditions of employment until the NMB
mediator determines that further mediation would be fruitless, has offered
the parties arbitration, at least one party has rejected the offer and a thirtyday cooling off period has expired.7 ' Even then, if the NMB determines
that a strike would deprive any section of the country of essential
transportation services, it reports such finding to the President who has
discretion to appoint a Presidential Emergency Board ("PEB") and
typically does so. 7 2 The status quo remains frozen while the PEB conducts
its proceedings and makes recommendations for resolution.
If either
party rejects the recommendations, the parties must continue to maintain
the status quo for another thirty days.74 Thus, although ultimately the
union may strike and the employer may make unilateral changes, the
RLA's emphasis is on coupling the freezing of the status quo with a heavy
66. See generally, DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS (1983) (recounting a two-year study
comparing techniques used in Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service mediation of private sector
collective bargaining with state mediation agency mediation of public sector collective bargaining in
the same state and commenting on how the state agency mediators tried to compensate for the absence
of a strike threat).
67. See Mark Keierleber, The Last Cut Buffalo Teachers Agree to Contract After 12-Year
Stalemate, THE 74 (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.the74million.org/article/the-last-cut-buffaloteachers-agree-to-contract-after-12-year-stalemate/-; Tiffany Lankes & Jay Ray, Who Wins Under
New Buffalo Teacher Contract, BUFFALO NEWS (Oct. 18, 2016), http://buffalonews.com/2016/10/
18/making-sense-new-buffalo-teacher-contract/.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2012).
Id. § 151a.
Id. § 155.
Id. §§ 155-56.
Id § 160
Id.
Id

20181
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dose of mediation to avoid resort to economic warfare. The NMB
mediator enjoys very broad discretion in deciding when to release the
parties from mediation and the statute envisions prolonged negotiations
and mediation as a tool for avoiding strikes and bringing about
agreements. The D.C. Circuit has explained:
It may well be that the likelihood of successful mediation
is marginal. That success of settlement may lie in the
realm of possibility, rather than confident prediction,
does not negative the good faith and validity of the
[Mediation] Board's effort. The legislature provided
procedures purposefully drawn out, and the Board's
process may draw on them even to the point that the
parties deem "almost interminable." 75
Defenders of the Triborough Law argue that the freezing of the status
quo and mandating of continued step increases after contract expiration
are necessary to offset the bargaining disadvantage that the Taylor Law's
strike prohibitions place on unions.76 Critics maintain that the Triborough
Law has inappropriately tilted the bargaining advantage to unionsn
although at least one management advocate has observed that employers
can gain bargaining leverage from resisting union efforts to make
improvements in wages and benefits retroactive and insisting that step
increases be considered a cost in calculating the contract settlement.7 8
Regardless of whether the balance requires recalibration, and I do not
attempt to address that issue, it is clear that under the Taylor Law as it has
evolved, the motive power in collective bargaining is the freezing of the
status quo plus a heavy dose of mediation. The policy judgment has been
made to trade off prolonged contract negotiations for significant reduction
75.

Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Nat'1 Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d 527, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

76. See, e.g., Casagrande & Millham, supra note 65.
77. See, e.g., TERRY O'NEIL & E. J. MCMAHON, TAYLOR MADE: THE COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF NEW YORK'S PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR 21 (2007), https://www.empirecenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Taylor-Made.pdf; Moses, supra note 51, at 117-118; Zwara, supra note
9, at 2.
78. Karlee S. Bolanos, UnderstandingTriborough: It is not Just a Complex ofBridges in the
City, MUNI BLOG (June 28, 2012), https://www.harrisbeach.com/new-york-municipalitiesblog/understanding-triborough-it-is-not-just-a-complex-of-bridges-in-the-city/. Although permissive
subjects covered in the expired contract are frozen along with mandatory subjects, the Appellate
Division has held that the permissive subjects are converted into mandatory subjects. Unif.

Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, v. Cuevas, 714 N.Y.S.2d 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). Thus,
permissive subjects, along with the mandatory subjects, are submitted to factfinding. Id.
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in strike incidents.
The next Part examines the Pennsylvania statute which, on its face,
is vastly different from the Taylor Law. Whereas the Taylor Law flatly
rejects a public employee right to strike under any circumstances and
backs that rejection with draconian penalties, the Pennsylvania statue has
a relatively liberal public employee right to strike. 7 9 Yet, as the statute
has evolved through labor board and court interpretations, the collective
bargaining process closely resembles the Taylor Law's.
III. THE MOTIVE POWER IN PENNSYLVANIA
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

PUBLIC

EMPLOYEE

In 1970, Pennsylvania enacted its Public Employee Relations Act,
also known as Act 195.80 As originally enacted, the statute conferred a
right to strike on all Pennsylvania public employees except police and
firefighters who are covered by another statute which provides for interest
arbitration, 8 ' and prison and mental hospital guards and court personnel
who are granted interest arbitration by Act 195.82 In 1992, Pennsylvania
enacted Act 88,83 which provides separate impasse procedures for public
school employees. 8 4 This paper focuses on Act 195 rather than the special
school employee procedures.
Act 195 permits mediation if a "dispute or impasse" exists following
"a reasonable period of negotiation."85 It further provides that if no
agreement has been reached "21 days after negotiations have commenced,
but in no event later than 150 days prior to the 'budget submission date'.
. . both parties shall immediately" request the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Mediation to intervene. 8 6 If the parties do not reach agreement twentyone days after the start of mediation "or in no event later than 130 days
prior to the 'budget submission date,"' the Bureau of Mediation must so

79. Highly acclaimed mediator Theodore Kheel criticized the Taylor Law's prohibition on
strikes as not providing for true collective bargaining. Although his criticism was rejected in New
York, it influenced the decision in Pennsylvania to include a right to strike in Act 195. DONOVAN
supra note 4, at 110.
80. 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.2301 (West 1970).

81.

Id.

§

1101.301(2) (excluding police and firefighters who are covered by another statute

which provides for interest arbitration).

82.
83.
84.

Id. § 1101.1001.
24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
Id. §§ 1121-A to 1122-A.

§§

85.

43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 1101.801

86.

Id.

11-1 101-A to 1172-A (West 1992).
(West 1970).
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advise the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB), which has
discretion to invoke factfinding." As a matter of policy, the PLRB has
invoked factfinding only when the parties jointly request it or the mediator
indicates that factfinding would be helpful in settling the dispute.8 ' The
PLRB and the courts have interpreted Act 195 to place on the union the
burden to take the initiative to ensure that mediation is exhausted prior to
a strike. If the employer refuses to join in a request for mediation, the
union must seek it unilaterally. 8 9
Mediation does not begin until the parties actually meet with the
mediator.90 If the PLRB fails to invoke fact-finding twenty days after
mediation began, the union may assume that the PLRB has decided that
fact-finding would not be helpful and the union may lawfully strike. 9 1
Act 195 provides for employers to sue to enjoin illegal strikes. 92
Employer unfair labor practices are not defenses to actions to enjoin
illegal strikes.93 Employees who defy strike injunctions are subject to
prosecution by the employer for contempt and, thereafter, the employer
may suspend, demote or discharge the employee. 94 The employer,
however, may not engage in self-help against illegally striking employees.
It must obtain an injunction followed by a contempt finding if the
employee defies the injunction. 95
Legal strikes in Pennsylvania may be enjoined upon petition by the
employer and a court finding that the strike poses a "clear and present
danger or threat to public health, safety or welfare." 96 As discussed infra,.
this standard makes injunctions more readily available in Pennsylvania
than in Illinois and Ohio, which require a showing of a clear and present
danger to public health and safety.97 Prior to the 1992 removal of public
education from coverage of the bargaining provisions of Act 195, a
§ 1101.802.

87.

Id.

88.

Martin H. Malin, PublicEmployees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J.

L. REF. 313, 354-55 (1993).
89. See N. Clarion Cnty. Sch. Dist., 15 Pub. Emp. Rep Pa. T 15208 (PLRB 1984). This
description of the Pennsylvania impasse process is taken from my prior article Public Employees'

Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 313 (1993).
90.

Commw.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Peters Township Sch. Dist. v. Peters Township Fed'n of Teachers, 501 A.2d 237 (Pa.

1985).
Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. 304 A.2d 922 (Pa. Commw. 1973).
43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1002 (West 1970).
Id. § 1101.1004.
Id. § 1101.1005.
City of Scranton v. Commonwealth, 505 A.2d 1360, 1363 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
43 PA. STATE AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1003.
See infra notes 141-43, 166-71 and accompanying text.
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practice developed whereby strikes in public education that, if continued,
would have precluded the school district from complying with the
mandate of having 180 school days were enjoined routinely. 98
With respect to the motive power in Pennsylvania public sector
collective bargaining, the most significant development came in 1993
when the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decided Philadelphia
Housing Authority v. PLRB.99 The court rejected the analogy to the private
sector under the National Labor Relations Act where an employer may
unilaterally change terms and conditions of employment after bargaining
to impasse,' 0 0 and approved a PLRB holding that under Act 195 an
employer commits an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally changes a
mandatory subject of bargaining, even after impasse, unless the
employees have gone on strike. 10 ' The court quoted favorably the PLRB's
rationale:
In our view, it would not serve the legislature's declared
goal of promoting orderly and constructive relationships
between public employers and their employees through
good faith collective bargaining to allow a public
employer to implement its final offer when the employees
in the unit have not disrupted the continuation of public
services by striking. Unilateral action by an employer
during a period of no contract while employees continue
to work serves to polarize the process and would
encourage strikes by employees who otherwise may wish
to continue working under the terms of the expired
agreement while negotiations continue.1 02
In other words, the court accepted the PLRB's concern that allowing
employers to make unilateral changes after reaching impasse would
increase the incidence of public employee strikes. Dissenting Judge
Collins expressed a different concern. In his view, not allowing unilateral
employer changes following impasse would, in times of fiscal stress,
prolong negotiations to the detriment of the public fisc.1 0 3 He wrote:

98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See Malin, supra note 88, at 357-58.

Phila. Hous. Auth. v. PLRB, 620 A.2d 594 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 599.
Id. at 600-01.
Id.
Id. at 601-02 (Collins, J., dissenting).
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[T]he ramifications of the instant opinion create a
precedent that compels municipal corporations or
authorities to continue to operate indefinitely under
expired labor agreements regardless of the financial
impossibility of doing so. To compel any municipality to
maintain financial commitments in perpetuity in the face
of a declining population or a shrinking tax base or any
other adverse circumstance, creates a precedent in this
Commonwealth which is most dangerous and is contrary
to the public interest.'
Experience since PhiladelphiaHousing Authority, has shown both
the majority and the dissent to be correct. Data available from the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation goes back only to 2004, but it shows
that strikes under Act 195 have become relatively rare events. The data
in Table 2 is current through February 8, 2018.
Table 2 Strikes Under Pa. Act 195
Year Contract
Expired

Number of Expiring
Contracts for Which
Notices Were Filed

Strikes for Contracts
that Expired This
Year

2004
2005
2006

305
290
296

1
4
7

2007

244

2

2008
2009
2010

294
282
283

0
5
0

2011
2012
2013

317
285
294

1
0
1

2014
2015
2016
2017

308
280
321
290

0
2
1
0

Average

292

1.71

104. Id.
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An average of just 1.71 strikes per year with an average of 292
contracts expiring each year over a 14-year period is nothing short of
amazing. However, there is also evidence of prolonged negotiations
which may have stressed public employer budgets. Over a dissent by
Chief Justice Castille, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a petition
by the City of Philadelphia for extraordinary relief that would have
enabled the court to consider the rule established in PhiladelphiaHousing
Authority.'0 5 Negotiations for a new contract between the parties had been
going on for four years but, because the union had not struck, wages and
working conditions were frozen at levels provided for in the expired
agreement. 106
The calibration of the balance of interests under Act 195 is somewhat
different from the calibration under the Taylor Law and the Triborough
Law. The status quo is frozen only with respect to mandatory subjects of
bargaining and employees are not entitled to step increases provided in
the expired contract.' 0 7 Furthermore, Act 195 evolved from a very
different starting point, i.e., reliance on a right to strike as the motive
power, than the Taylor Law.108 However, they have ended up in the same
place. It appears that under PhiladelphiaHousing Authority, the motive
power in collective bargaining under Act 195 has evolved from relying on
a right to strike to the freezing of the status quo even after impasse, until
agreement is reached, as long as the union does not strike. In both New
York and Pennsylvania the policy trade-off has been significant reduction
in the incidence of strikes versus prolongation of collective negotiations.
The next Part considers Illinois and Ohio, two states where the right to
strike provides a good deal of the motive power in public sector collective
bargaining.
IV. THE MOTIVE POWER IN PUBLIC
BARGAINING IN ILLINOIS AND OHIO

SECTOR

COLLECTIVE

In 1983, Illinois and Ohio enacted their public sector collective
bargaining statutes, which took effect in 1984. Both states recognized a

105. City of Phila. v. AFSCME Dist. 33, 68 A.3d 323, 324 (Pa. 2013).
106. See id at 324 (Castille, J. dissenting).
107. See Neshaminy Fed'n of Teachers, Local Union 1417 v. PLRB, 986 A.2d 908, 913-14 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2009); Pa. State Park Officers Ass'n v. PLRB, 854 A.2d 674, 679-82 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2004).
108. Compare 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1003 (West 1970), with N.Y. Cv.
SERV. LAW § 108(2) (McKinney 1959).
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right to strike for most of their public employees, but had markedly
different conditions for a lawful strike to occur. The two states thus
provided an unintended but natural experiment in public sector collective
bargaining.
Illinois has separate statutes and separate labor relations boards
governing public education and the rest of the public sector. The Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act ("IELRA")' 0 9 is administered by the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board ("IELRB")." 0 The Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act..' is administered by the Illinois Labor
Relations Board ("ILRB"), which is divided into a Local Panel with
jurisdiction over Chicago, Cook County and other specialty districts
serving the city and county,1" 2 and a State Panel, with jurisdiction over the
state and all other units of local government.11 3 Most Illinois public
employees have the right to strike. Excepted are law enforcement,
firefighters, security employees (primarily corrections officers) and
paramedics employed by fire departments," 14 all of whom have a right to
interest arbitration." 5
Until 2011, the requirements for a lawful strike under both statutes
were essentially the same: (1) the employees had to be represented by an
exclusive representative; (2) the collective bargaining agreement must
have expired or no collective bargaining agreement had ever been in
effect; (3) mediation had been unsuccessful; (4) there was no agreement
to use interest arbitration; and (5) at least five days' notice of intent to
strike was given." 6 In 2011, the legislature amended the strike provisions
of the IELRA. For all jurisdictions, other than the Chicago Public
Schools, after the parties have been in mediation for at least fifteen days,
either party or the mediator may initiate a public posting process."' Each
party provides the mediator with its final offer and a cost analysis of the
offer." 8 The mediator transmits them to the IELRB, which posts them on
its website.1 9 The final offers remain posted on the IELRB website until

109.

115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 to 21 (West 2014).

110.

Id.at5/5.

111.

5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/1 to 28 (West 2013).

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 315/5(b).
Id. at 315/5(a).
Id. at 315/17(a).
Id. at 315/14(a).
Id. at 315/17(a); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13 (State Bar Ass'n ed. 2010).
115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5-12(a-5)(1) (West 2014).
Id. at 5/12 (a-5)(2).
Id.
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an agreement is reached.1 20 The union may lawfully strike after the final
offers have been posted for at least fourteen days and the union has given
at least ten days' notice of its intent to strike.121
Since 2011, for a strike by employees of the Chicago Public Schools
to be lawful, the parties must first resort to factfinding. The issuance of
the factfimder's recommendations and their rejection by either party leads
to the publication of the recommendations and a 30-day cooling off
period.1 2 2 For the strike to be lawful, it must be authorized by a vote of at
least 75 percent of the union's members.1 2 3 The union must also give at
least ten days' notice of intent to strike.1 24
At the time the special rules for the Chicago Public Schools were
enacted, proponents declared that the requirement of strike authorization
from at least 75 percent of the union membership meant that the Chicago
Teachers Union would find it impossible to strike.1 2 5 They were wrong.
Indeed, the strategy of deterring strikes by requiring a 75 percent
authorization vote likely backfired.
In the first collective bargaining negotiations after the new rules took
effect, the Chicago Teachers Union struck for seven school days. The
strike began on Monday, September 10, 2012.126 The parties reached a
tentative agreement in the ensuing weekend. 12 7 However, on Sunday,
September 16, the union's House of Delegates did not endorse the
tentative agreement.1 2 8 The union leadership suspended the meeting until
the following Tuesday, September 18.129 At the reconvened meeting, the
delegates endorsed the tentative agreement and the schools reopened the
following day.1 3 0
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 5/13(b)(2)-(b)(3).
Id. at 5/12(a-10), 5/13(b)(2.5).
Id. at 5/13(b)(2.10).
Id. at 5/13(b)(3).

125. See STEVEN K. ASHBY & ROBERT BRUNO, A FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION:
THE STORY OF THE CHICAGO TEACHERS STRIKE 102-04 (2016).
126. See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Joel Hood & Kristen Mack, Picket Lines Up After Teachers,
CPS Fail to Prevent Strike, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 10, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-0910/news/chi-chicago-public-schools-chicago-teachers-union-contract-talks-strike_1picket-linesteachers-strike-president-david-vitale.

127.

Id.

128. See Monica Davey, As ChicagoStrike Goes On, the Mayor Digs In, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/education/chicago-teachers-strike-enters-second-week.
html?action-click&contentCollection=U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtyp
e=article.

129.

Id.

130.

See Monica Davey & Steven Yaccino, Teachers End Chicago Strike on Second Try, N.Y.
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What happened? The new requirement of a 75 percent strike
authorization vote presented the union leadership with a challenge. They
had to motivate the overwhelming majority of union members to vote. To
do this, the union leadership engaged in a very effective internal
organizing campaign. 13 1 They motivated the rank-and-file emotionally as
well as intellectually and maintained the fervor throughout the strike with
massive rallies.' 32 The leadership became victims of their own success.
The fervor of the membership made it impossible for the leadership to sell
the tentative agreement to the House of Delegates on the first try that
Sunday.
Lawful strikes in Illinois may be enjoined upon a showing that the
strike poses a clear and present danger to public health and safety.133
During the debates over the IPLRA, the legislature expressly rejected the
Pennsylvania approach of enjoining strikes posing a clear and present
danger to the public health, safety or welfare, in favor of the narrower.
public health and safety standard.1 3 4 Thus, unlike Pennsylvania where a..
pattern developed of enjoining strikes in public education when their
duration threatened the ability to have a 180-day school year,1 35 efforts to
enjoin strikes in Illinois public education have been rare and unsuccessful.
In the 2012 Chicago teachers strike, after the union's House of
Delegates failed to endorse the tentative agreement, the city sued the next
day, Monday, and moved for a temporary restraining order.1 36 The court:
denied the motion and scheduled it for hearing the following Wednesday,
i.e., the day after the scheduled reconvening of the union's House of.
Delegates.1 3 7 The House of Delegates' approval of the tentative agreement
on Tuesday rendered the law suit moot.' 38 During a strike in fall 2017 by
support staff in Palatine Township Elementary School District 15, a
circuit court judge issued a temporary restraining order finding that the
18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/us/vote-scheduled-on-chicagoTIMES (Sept.
teachers-contract.html
131. See ASHBY &BRUNO, supranote 125, at 108.

132.
133.
2014).

Id.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/18 (West 2013); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13 (West

134.

See Martin H. Malin, Implementing the Illinois EducationalLabor Relations Act, 61 CHI.-

KENT L. REV. 101, 131-32 (1985).
135. See Malin, supra note, 88 at 357-58.
136. See Emmeline Zhao, Chicago Teachers Strike Suspended, Students HeadBack to School
Wednesday, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2012, 3:40 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/

09/18/chicago-teachers-strike-sn_1 895082.html.
137. Id.
13 8. Id.
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absence of nurses and special education aides posed a "clear and present
danger" to special education students' health and safety,1 39 but dissolved
the injunction a week later finding that the school district failed to
establish the clear and present danger.1 4 0
Outside of public education, the IPLRA requires an employer
seeking to enjoin a lawful strike to petition the ILRB for a determination
that the strike poses a clear and present danger and allows a suit to enjoin
the strike only upon ILRB authorization. 14 1 If a court grants the injunction
request it may order a return to work only by those employees necessary
to avoid the clear and present danger and the bargaining unit must proceed
to interest arbitration. 14 2 As I have previously summarized:
[T]he Illinois statutes rely primarily on the threat and use
of economic weapons to settle bargaining impasses. The
statutes minimize labor board and court intervention and
place maximum control in the hands of the parties.
Although both statutes require prestrike mediation, the
parties control the timing of mediation and whether they
will use any other third-party assistance. 143
Most public employees in Ohio have a right to strike after exhausting
statutory impasse procedures.'"4
Exceptions are law enforcement,
firefighters, emergency medical or rescue personnel, exclusive nurses
units, employees of the state school for the deaf or the state school for the
blind, employees of any public employee retirement system, corrections
officers, guards at penal or mental institutions, psychiatric attendants
employed at mental health forensic facilities, and youth leaders employed
at juvenile correctional facilities, all of whom have a right to interest
arbitration. 145
Fifty days prior to the expiration date of a collective bargaining

139.

See Bob Sunsjara, Judge Orders District 15 Nurses, Aids Back to Work, DAtLY HERALD

(Oct. 17, 2017, 7:20 PM), http://www.dailyherald.com/news/20171017/judge-orders-district-15nurses-aides-back-to-work.
140. See Press Release, Ill. Educ. Ass'n, Judge Dismisses Case, Reaffirms Workers' Right to
Strike (Nov. 7, 2017), https://ieanea.org/2017/11/07/judge-dismisses-case-reaffirms-workers-rightto-strike/.

141. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/18(a) (West 2013).
142. Id.
143. Malin, supra note 88, at 342.
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (West 2013).
145. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
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agreement, either party may petition the State Employment Relations
Board ("SERB") to intervene and forty-five days prior to the expiration
date, SERB must appoint a mediator. 14 6 Anytime thereafter, either party
may initiate factfinding and SERB must appoint a factfinding panel of up
to three members within fifteen days of a request. 14 7 SERB provides the
parties with a list of five factfinders and the parties have seven days to
notify SERB of their selection of one or three factfinders. 14 8 If the parties
fail to so notify SERB, SERB appoints a single factfinder. 149 No later than
fourteen days following appointment, the factfinder(s) issue(s) findings of
fact and recommendations for settlement and serve(s) them on the parties
and SERB.15 0 Upon receipt, the union must make the findings and
recommendations available to all of its members and schedule an election
within seven days.15 1 The election must be by secret ballot. 15 2 Within
twenty-four hours of the vote tally, and not later than twenty-four hours
following the seven-day period after issuance of the findings and
recommendations, the union must serve on the employer and SERB the
results of the vote.15 3 Failure to serve notice of rejection of the
recommendations in a timely manner constitutes acceptance of the
recommendations. 15 4 A similar timeline applies to the employer who must
submit the findings and recommendations to its legislative governing
body upon receipt. 1 5 The legislative body must vote within seven days
and the employer must serve the results of the vote on the union and SERB
within twenty-four hours and not later than twenty-four hours following
the seven-day period.1 5 6 Failure to serve notice of rejection in a timely
manner constitutes acceptance of the recommendations."
Rejection of the recommendations requires a vote by three-fifths of
all eligible voters, i.e. all members of the legislature and all members of
If either party rejects the recommendations, SERB
the union. 58

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. §4117.14(C)(2).
Id. §4117.14(C)(3).
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publicizes them for seven days. 5 9 The union may then strike, provided it
gives ten days notice of its intent to strike. 160 In East ClevelandEducation
Association, SERB held that intermittent strikes are not authorized by the
statute.161

An employer may sue to enjoin an illegal strike and employer unfair
labor practices are not a defense.1 6 2 The employer may also petition
SERB for a determination that the strike is not authorized by the statute
and SERB must rule within seventy-two hours.1 6 3 If SERB finds the strike
unauthorized, the employer must give striking employees twenty-four
hours' notice; after which if the employees remain on strike, the employer
may suspend or terminate the strikers, freeze their compensation for a year
and deduct from their wages two days' pay for each day on strike.' 6 4 The
penalties, except for the double pay deduction for each day on strike, are
appealable to SERB.165
As in Illinois, lawful strikes may be enjoined if they pose a clear and
present danger to public health and safety.' 6 6 An employer may obtain a
temporary restraining order from the court of common pleas which may
last no longer than seventy-two hours.1 67 During the period that the order
is in effect, SERB must determine whether the clear and present danger
standard has been met.' 6 8 If SERB finds a clear and present danger, the
court may extend the injunction to a total maximum period of sixty
days.1 6 9 During the period the injunction is in effect, SERB mediates and
the mediator may decide to make the mediation sessions public.1 7 0 After
forty-five days, the mediator may issue a public report including each
party's position statement and offers for settlement.171 I previously
contrasted the Ohio approach to Illinois':
In general, Ohio's approach to public sector impasse
resolution differs considerably from Illinois' approach.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(6)(a) (West 2017).
Id. §4117.14(D)(2).
E. Cley. Educ. Ass'n, 11 OPER 1333 (1994).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.15(A)-(B) (West 2017).
Id. §4117.23(A).
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Ohio places such substantial restraints on the parties' use
of economic weapons that it does not rely on the fear of
economic warfare as the primary method of settling
bargaining impasses. Rather, it relies primarily on factfinding and on public pressure to bring the parties to an
agreement. The extent of the reliance on fact-finding is
evident from the requirement of fact-finding and the
specific procedural detail required to reject fact-finder
recommendations. A minor procedural error results in
the recommendations being deemed accepted. The extent
of the reliance on publicity is evident from the
requirement that the OSERB publicize the fact finder's
recommendations, and from the authorization of public
mediation sessions and public mediator reports following
the enjoining of strikes which endanger public health and
safety. This contrasts markedly with the Illinois labor
boards' rules, which provide for private negotiations and
mandate mediator confidentiality. 17 2
In 1993, I published a study of the effects of legalizing public
employee strikes in Illinois and Ohio. Although the pre- and postlegalization raw data were not completely comparable, the raw data
clearly showed a reduction in strikes in both states despite an increase in
bargaining.1 7 3 1 Summarized the raw data:
[T]he experiences in Ohio and Illinois run counter to the
expectation that enactment of comprehensive public
sector bargaining laws containing a right to strike would
increase the incidence of strikes. Despite an increase in
bargaining activity in the first eight years under the Ohio
statute, strikes averaged 13.75 per year, compared with
an average of 55.71 strikes per year from 1974 to 1980.
In the first eight years of the Illinois statute, strikes
averaged 15.75 throughout public education, despite an
increase in bargaining, compared to an average of 24.56
strikes per year among K-12 teachers prior to the

172.

Malin, supra note 88, at 348.

173.

Id. at 372-73.
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IELRA.1 7 4
After comparing the raw data, I factored in the inflation and
unemployment rates for each year. Single and multivariate analyses of
the Ohio data showed a very strong correlation between the change in the
law and the reduction in strikes in that state. 17 5 The change in the law was
consistently associated with a decrease of more than thirty-five strikes per
year.1 7 6 In Illinois, the correlation was much weaker with the change in
the law being associated with decreases of between seven and eleven
strikes per year and the result, except in one instance, was not statistically
significant.1 7 7 I concluded that the data "do not firmly support a
conclusion that the legalization of public employee strikes in Illinois and
Ohio caused their frequency to decrease . .[but] there is no evidence that
legalization caused strikes to increase in frequency." 78
Why was the correlation between the change in the law and the
reduction in strike incidence so much stronger in Ohio? One major
difference between the two statutes was Ohio's requirement of factfinding
and rejection of the factfinder recommendations in accordance with
stringent procedural requirements compared to Illinois's requirement of
resort to mediation. A key difference in the experience under the two
statutes was in strike duration. In Illinois, more than 60 percent of all
strikes lasted ten days or fewer and only one strike lasted more than thirty
days, whereas in Ohio, fewer than half of the authorized strikes were over
in ten or fewer days and more than 16 percent lasted more than thirty
days.1 7 9 A Chi Square analysis looking at strike duration in five-day
intervals showed that strikes in Ohio were of significantly greater duration
with the result being significant below the .01 confidence level.' 80
It is likely that the longer duration of strikes in Ohio is due to the
requirement of pre-strike factfinding. As I explained in my 1993 article:
Although Ohio's fact-finding process has contributed to
the settlement of many contracts without a strike, it also
is likely that when a party rejects a fact finder's report

174. Id.
175. Id. at 374.
176. Id. at 374 n.301.
177. Id. at 374-76.
178. Id. at 378.
179. Id. at 380.
180. Id.
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and a strike ensues, the fact-finding process adds to the
difficulty of settling the strike. A fact-finding hearing is
litigation and is therefore adversarial in nature. Parties are
likely to perceive the fact finder's report in terms of
whether they have won or lost. Certainly, a party that
votes to reject a fact finder's report believes that it has
lost. The party that has not rejected it is likely to react by
saying, "Why should I change anything? A neutral
objective fact finder found what is right and fair."

'

Thus, the fact-finding may serve to further polarize the
parties, making the impasse more difficult to settle. This
polarization can be particularly acute if the party that did
not reject the fact finder's report views the report as
vindicating its position. . . . At a minimum, the
requirement of fact-finding injects a new issue at the
bargaining table-why should we deviate from the fact
finder's recommendations?-which diverts attention
from the settlement issues. The fact-finding also may
polarize the parties further and make it more difficult for
the party that did not reject the fact finder's
recommendation to change its position.18
Other data reinforced the link between mandatory pre-strike
factfinding and increase in strike duration.' 82 Ohio allows parties to adopt
their own mutually agreed dispute settlement process ("MAD"),' 8 3 and in
Ohio a primary reason for adopting a MAD was to eliminate the
factfinding process. 184 A comparison of the experience with negotiations
pursuant to a MAD and negotiations under the statutory procedure
revealed that there were more strikes under MADs.'8 Although strikes
under MADS were equally likely to be resolved within ten days as strikes
under the statutory procedures,186 over one-fourth of strikes under the
statutory procedure lasted more than thirty days compared to less than

181. Id. at 383-84.
182. Id.
183. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.

§ 4117.14(C)

184.

Malin, supranote 88, at 384.

185.
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Id. at 385.
Id. at 384.

(West 2013).
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'

one-eighth of strikes under MADs.' 8 7 A chi square analysis comparing
strike duration in five day increments found strikes under the statutory
procedure lengthier than strikes under MADs with the difference being
significant at the .025 confidence level. 88
Data from Pennsylvania reinforced the link between factfinding and
strike duration. In Pennsylvania, PLRB has discretion to impose prestrike factfinding and does so when the parties or the mediator indicate it
could be helpful.1 89 Yet strikes without factfinding were twice as likely
as strikes following factfinding to be resolved within ten days and strikes
following factfinding were more than twice as likely to last more than
thirty days as strikes without it.1 90 A chi square analysis found strikes
following factfinding were significantly longer with the result significant
at the .05 confidence level.' 9
In Illinois, the motive power in public sector collective bargaining is
the strike. In Ohio, it is a combination of factfimding and a limited right
to strike. Experience in the two states shows a clear policy trade-off:
fewer strikes when the right to strike is limited by a requirement that the
parties first resort to factfimding but those strikes that do occur last
significantly longer.
Recent experience in Illinois and Ohio is particularly interesting.
Data from SERB's annual reports show that Ohio had a total of 209 strikes
during the fourteen-year period through Fiscal Year 2008, which ended
on June 30, 2008, or an average of approximately fifteen strikes per
year.' 92 As the economy declined, so did the number of strikes, with only
two in Fiscal Year 2009 and none in Fiscal Year 2010.193 There were none
again in Fiscal Year 2011, one in Fiscal Year 2012, two in Fiscal Year
2013, one in Fiscal Year 2014 and two in Fiscal Year 2015.194 Thus,
strikes came close to disappearing in Ohio during the recession and have
not come back.
In Illinois, the annual reports of the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board are summarized in Table 3.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id. at 390-93.

192.

STATE EMPL'T RELATIONS BD. OF OHIO, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 11 (2015).

193.
194.

Id.
Id.
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Table 3 Strikes Under the IELRA

Fiscal Year

Strikes

Strike Notices

1998-99
1999-2000
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05

9
9
7
10
7
10
4

43
43
50
40
47
46
36

2005-06

5

36

2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17

3
9
1
4
2
5
6
3
3
5
5

24
34
11
13
23
19
23
21
14
11
14

-

Here too, there was a dramatic decline in strikes and in notices of
intent to strike with the Great Recession. This is particularly noteworthy,
as the recession marked a highly concessionary negotiating environment.
This is likely due to the nature of a strike in the public sector. Whereas in
the private sector, a strike is an economic weapon, in the public sector a
strike does not interrupt the primary source of the employer's revenues
collection of taxes. In public education, where states mandate 180 school
days as a condition of school district receipt of state aid, the prevalent
practice of making up strike days means that neither the employer nor the
striking workers are likely to lose revenue. Consequently, in the public
sector, the strike is primarily a political weapon. Success depends on the
union's ability to gamer support for its strike effort. During the recession,
unions realized that a strike, when unemployment was in double digits,
would likely not gamer much public support. The decline in the number
of notices of intent to strike indicates that unions were not even
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threatening to strike during these difficult economic times. 195 In contrast,
the use of interest arbitration by employees prohibited from striking
increased dramatically during the recession.196
Since the recession, unemployment rates have plummeted but wages
have remained stagnated.1 97 Consequently, recognition of the low
likelihood that strikes will garner public support has continued to keep
strikes and threats to strike low. The high point for strikes in Illinois
education since the recession was in 2012-13.198 The IELRB reports strike
data by fiscal year but the state's fiscal year runs from July 1st to June
30th. Hence, the fiscal year reports roughly parallel the school year. The
first strike in the 2012-13 school year was the Chicago Teachers Union
strike against the Chicago Board of Education.1 99 The Chicago Teachers
Union did a masterful job of garnering public support. It emphasized such
issues as overcrowded, unairconditioned classrooms and the use of
excessive classroom time for standardized testing; issues that garnered
considerable public support. 20 0 The Union also worked closely with
community groups and staged public rallies to maintain public support. 2 0 1
The strike was very successful. 202 It is possible that the Chicago Public
Schools strike inspired others. That inspiration, however, appears to have
worn off by the next school year.
In New York and Pennsylvania, the motive power is the freezing of
the status quo until agreement is reached.20 3 This trades off a lower rate
of strikes for more prolonged bargaining.20 4 In Illinois, the motive power
of a right to strike provides an urgency not present in New York and
Pennsylvania.
But just as strikes still occur in New York and
Pennsylvania, prolonged bargaining can still occur in Illinois. The outlier
in this regard is the AFSCME - State of Illinois negotiations which have
195.
This is not the first time I have made these observations. See Martin H. Malin, Two Models
ofInterest Arbitration,28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 145, 151 (2013).

196.

Id. at 154.

197. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Employment Status of the
Civilian NoninstitutionalPopulation, 1948 to Date, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS (Last updated

Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat0l.pdf.
198. See supra Table 3.
199. STATE OF ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 11, https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/elrb/Documents/2013-Annual-Report-

final.pdf.
200.

See ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 125 at 203.

201.
202.
203.
204.

See
See
See
See

id at 194.
id. at 105.
supra Sections II.B., III.
supra Sections II.B., III.
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been going on since 2015.205
The collective bargaining agreement expired on June 30, 2015. The
parties began negotiations for a successor on February 9, 2015. They
entered into agreements to negotiate in good faith without threat of strike
or lockout until reaching impasse. They further agreed that if there was a
dispute over whether impasse had been reached, they would jointly submit
the issue to the ILRB.
On January 8, 2016, the State declared impasse, presented its final
offer and broke off negotiations. A week later the State filed unfair labor
practice charges alleging that AFSCME's refusal to join the State in
petitioning the ILRB to determine whether the parties were at impasse
amounted to a failure to bargain in good faith. The State sought a
declaration from the JLRB that it was free to implement its final offer.
Interestingly, although there was dicta stating that an employer may
unilaterally implement following impasse, no authority in Illinois had
expressly so held.206
On February 22, 2016, AFSCME filed unfair labor practice charges
against the State, alleging, among other things that the State breached its
duty to bargain when it cut off negotiations on January 8. AFSCME's
charges enabled the ILRB to reach the impasse issue. It made the State's
claim that the parties were at impasse, in effect, an affirmative defense to
the failure to bargain charge. Had AFSCME not filed the charge, the
ILRB would have to have decided whether it had authority to, in effect,
provide a declaratory judgment or advisory opinion.20 7
The ALJ found that the parties were at impasse on certain issues but
were still making progress on others. With respect to a third group of
issues, she found any impasse that might exist was tainted by the State's
failure to provide AFSCME with relevant information that the union had
requested. She rejected AFSCME's position that she order the parties to
resume bargaining on all issues, but also rejected the State's position that
the issues on which she found impasse were sufficiently critical to the
205. The following description of the AFSCME - State negotiations comes from the decisions
of the ILRB Administrative Law Judge and the Board, State of Ill. Dept. of Central Mgmt. Servs. and

AFSCME Council 31, Nos. S-CB-16-017 & S-CA-16-087 (ILRB ALJ Sept. 2, 2016), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, Nos. S-CB-16-017 & S-CA-16-087 (ILRB Dec. 13, 2016) and from Martin H. Malin,
The AFSCME - State of Illinois Negotiations: Traveling in Uncharted Waters, ILL. PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REP., Winter 2017, at 2.
206. Malin, supra 205 at 14-16. The ILRB, in finding that the parties were at impasse, expressly
disclaimed deciding whether the State was free to unilaterally implement all or even part of its final

offer. Id. at 14.
207. See id. at 9.
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overall negotiations that the State was free to implement its final offer
unilaterally. Instead, she recommended an order allowing the State to
implement its final offer with respect to those issues on which the parties
were at impasse but requiring that they resume bargaining on all others.
The ALJ recommended that the State be required to provide the requested
information to AFSCME.
Both parties filed exceptions with the ILRB. The ILRB adopted the
single critical issue doctrine developed under the National Labor
Relations Act, found that the parties were at impasse over subcontracting
which was a single critical issue and dismissed AFSCME's charge that
the State had breached its duty by breaking off negotiations on January 8,
2016. The ILRB declined to rule on whether the State could unilaterally
implement its offer because that issue was not before it. Both parties
appealed and on March 1, 2017, the Illinois Appellate Court granted
AFSCME's motion for a stay.208 The stay stopped the State from
unilaterally implementing its offer. In the November 2018 election
Democrat J. B. Pritzker defeated incumbent Governor Bruce Rauner.
With a new governor who is not as hostile to organized labor as his
predecessor, the negotiations between AFSCME and the state will likely
resume with a much higher likelihood of the parties reaching agreement.
The extraordinary duration of the AFSCME-State negotiations
appears attributable to a high level of risk aversion on each side.
AFSCME appears to be very reluctant to strike, probably realizing that in
times of generally stagnant wages, a strike has a high risk of not garnering
public support. The State appears unwilling to act unilaterally unless it
has the prior approval of the labor board. The result is the current
stalemate.2 09
The other major outlier in Illinois' experience with the strike as
motive power in its public sector negotiations poses more substantial
policy issues. It occurred in what was then the Homer School District in
rural Champaign County in 1986.210 The strike began on October 17,
1986, and did not end until after the end of the school year.2 1 ' The
resulting contract did not resolve two of the issues that precipitated the

208.
stay).
209.

State of Ill. v. AFSCME Council 31, No. 160827 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 1, 2017) (order granting
As this article was in press, AFSCME and the State reach agreement on a new contract

covering the period July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2023. See State Employees Ratify New Union
Contract, https://www.afseme31.org/news/state-employees-ratify-new-union-contract-2019.

210. See Malin, supra note 88, at 397.
211. Id.
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strike.212 The students lost essentially a year of schooling, the school
district lost considerable state aid and ultimately had to merge with
another district, and most of the striking teachers never returned to their
jobs.213 Policymakers evaluating a right to strike as the motive power
must determine whether to run the risk of an outlier strike such as Homer.
The true antidote for strikes is interest arbitration. As demonstrated
in a comprehensive study of police and firefighter interest arbitration
under the Taylor Law,2 14 interest arbitration provides almost total
immunity to strikes. The next section examines Florida and Michigan
which have neither a right to strike, a Triborough Law, nor interest
arbitration.
V.

FLORIDA AND MICHIGAN: WHAT MOTIVE POWER IN PUBLIC

SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINNG?

The Florida approach to impasse resolution is quite similar to what
the Taylor Committee recommended. Florida prohibits strikes by all
2 16
public employees. 2 15 Strikes may be enjoined by the circuit court.
Defiance of a court's injunction is punishable by fines for contempt of up
2 17
to $5,000 for the union and $50 to $100 per day for union leaders.
Striking unions may be liable to the employer for damages incurred by the
employer because of the strike. 2 1 8 The Florida Public Employment
Relations Commission ("PERC") may suspend or revoke the striking
union's certification, revoke its dues checkoff, and fine it up to $20,000
per day for each day of the strike or an amount equal to the cost to the
public of the strike.219 PERC may also, after a hearing, discharge striking
employees or subject them to probationary periods of eighteen months
and disqualify them from raises for one year.2 20
After a reasonable period of negotiations, either party may secure the

212. Id.
213. Id. at 397-98.
214.

Thomas Kochan et al., The Long Haul Effects ofInterest Arbitration: The Case ofNew York

State's Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 565, 569 (2010) (finding that in the thirty years
since New York adopted interest arbitration there was not a single complete work stoppage among
police or firefighters in the state).

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.505 (West 2013).
Id. § 447.507(1)-(2).
Id. § 447.507(3).
Id. § 447.507(4).
Id. § 447.507(6)(a)(2)-(a)(4).
Id. § 447.507(5)(a)-(c).
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appointment of a mediator, except that mediation is prohibited when the
governor is the employer. 2 2 1 Thereafter, upon the request of either party,
PERC appoints a "special magistrate," who is, in effect, a factfinder,
222
except no magistrate is appointed where the governor is the employer.
The parties may agree to waive the special magistrate step in the
223
The magistrate conducts hearings and issues
process.
recommendations for resolution.2 24 Parties may reject all or part of the
recommendations but if they fail to do so within twenty calendar days, the
recommendations are deemed accepted.2 25 When recommendations are
rejected, the employer's chief executive officer and the union submit their
positions, along with the magistrate's recommendations to the employer's
legislative body which holds hearings and takes "such action as it deems
to be in the public interest, including the interest of the public employees
involved." 2 2 6
The parties must incorporate the legislature's
determinations into their collective bargaining agreement and the union
must submit the agreement for employee ratification.22 7 If the employees
fail to ratify, the legislative resolution goes into effect anyway but only
for the first fiscal year that was the subject of the negotiations.2 28
PERC and the Florida courts have treated the legislature as a quasiadjudicative body for impasse proceedings. For example, during the
legislative resolution process, neither party may engage in ex parte
contacts with the legislators.22 9 Moreover, the chief executive, such as the
mayor, has no authority to veto the legislature's resolution. 2 3 0 The Florida
District Court of Appeal has recognized that often the legislators will also
be the negotiators, creating a situation fraught with peril:
[F]requently, the negotiator and the legislative body are
one and the same body wearing two hats. In this case, the
Orlando City Commission is the public employer
responsible for negotiating, in an adversary setting, a
221. Id. § 447.403(1).
222. Id. § 447.403(2)-(3).
223. Id. § 447.403(2)(a).
224. Id. § 447.403(3).
225. Id.
226. Id. § 447.403(4)(a)-(d).
227. Id. § 447.403(4)(e).
228. Id.
229. Jacksonville Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 122, 15 FPER 20327 (1989).
230. Dade Cty. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Miami-Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 160 So. 3d
482, 483, 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
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collective bargaining contract with the City's firefighters.
Yet once a contract impasse occurs, the City Commission
must put on its legislative hat because it is also the
legislative body. It must depart from its adversary role
and suddenly become neutral, an awkward position
because the City Commission must adjudicate disputes as
a legislative body to which it is a party in interest as a
public employer. This situation becomes very difficult in
cases of acrimonious contract disputes where the sides
have polarized and waged political war through the news
media.23 1
When the employer is the governor, there is no special magistrate
proceeding.232 Instead, the issues in dispute are referred to a legislative
committee which conducts hearings, followed by legislative resolution of
the contested issues.233 Moreover, because the governor's veto power is
rooted in the Florida Constitution, the governor may veto the legislative
determination, at least when that determination is part of an appropriations
bill. 2 3 4
The Florida approach, which largely embodies the approach
recommended by the Taylor Committee, is not true collective bargaining.
It is the employer that ultimately determines the resolution of negotiation
impasses. The Taylor Committee recognized this and expressly declined
to label what it recommended as collective bargaining. 235 Furthermore, it
is important to realize that the Taylor Committee did not view affording
employees a voice in determining their terms and conditions of

231.

City of Orlando v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1365, 384 So. 2d 941, 945 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1980). It was the concern that the legislative determination model was unworkable, when
the executive was hired by the legislative body and when-members of the legislative body were on
the employer's bargaining team, that led New York in 1974, to except school districts from legislative
determination. See DONOVAN, supra note 4, at 217-18.

§ 447.403(2)(b)

(West 2013).

232.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

233.

Id. The constitutionality of these provisions was upheld in Fla. Pub. Employees Council

79 v. Bush, 860 So.2d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
234. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local S-20 v. State, 221 So.3d 736, 738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2017).
235. TAYLOR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 ("The term 'collective bargaining' has
thus come to connote a type of joint-determination by unions and private management which ...
cannot be transferred literally to the public employment sector. An objective evaluation of the
questions before us will be assisted, we believe, by use of the term 'collective negotiations' to signify
the participation of public employees in the determination of at least some of their conditions of
employment. . ."); see also DONOVAN, supra note 4, at 32.
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employment as an end in itself; rather, it was a means to the ultimate end
of preventing strikes.2 36 Vesting final authority over employees' terms
and conditions of employment with the legislature recognized the
democratic principle of legislative supremacy.
The Taylor Committee, and the Florida approach, however, do not
take into account a key reason for public employee collective bargaining.
When employees' wages and working conditions are left to be decided in
the political process, employees and their unions are inherently
outnumbered by members of the public who as users and purchasers of
the employees' services, desire greater and better services at the lowest
possible cost.2 37 Viewed in this light, a strike puts pressure on the users
and purchasers who outnumber the employees, causing them to reevaluate
their cost-benefit calculations.2 38
The recent teacher strikes in West Virginia and other states illustrate
this phenomenon. For example, public employees in West Virginia have
no collective bargaining rights and strikes are prohibited. 23 9 Teacher
compensation is set by state statute. The state legislature, catered to the
desires of the majority of the public, who desired to keep the costs of
public education to a minimum, and enacted pay raises of 2 percent in the
first year and 1 percent in the following two years.2 4 0 These raises were
offset by increases in the cost of health insurance. 2 4 1 As a result, teachers
struck shutting down schools state-wide for nine days.242 This caused the
public through their legislative representatives to reevaluate their costbenefit calculations.2 43 The strike ended when the governor signed
legislation giving teachers a 5 percent raise.244
236.

See DONOVAN, supranote 4, at 32.

237. See Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining:A PoliticalPerspective, 83 YALE
L.J. 1156, 1159 (1974).
238.

See Clyde W. Summers, Bargainingin the Government's Business: Principles andPolitics,

18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 275 (1987).
239. Letter from Roger W. Tompkins, Attorney General, State of West Virginia Office of the
Attorney General, to Henry Marockie, State Superintendent of Schools (Mar. 8, 1990).
240. Todd Baucher & Sheena Steffan, Update: W Va. House Passes Amended Bill to Give 2%
Raise to
Teachers,
State
Police
Officers,
THENEWSCENTER
(Feb.
13,
2018),
http://www.thenewscenter.tv/content/news/Possible-PEIA-cutbacks-concern-teachers-public-

employees-470180613.html.
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The motive power in public sector collective bargaining in Michigan
has changed over the years. In 1947, as New York was enacting the
Condon-Wadlin Act, Michigan enacted the Hutchinson Act which
similarly prohibited public employee strikes.24 5 However, in School
Districtfor the City of Holland v. Holland Education Association, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that an illegal strike is not automatically
enjoinable.246 The court opined that it was contrary to the state's public
policy to enjoin a labor dispute in the absence of violence, irreparable
injury or breach of the peace.247 The court vacated an injunction issued
by the trial court and suggested that on remand, the trial court "inquire
into whether, as charged by the defendants, the plaintiff school district has
refused to bargain in good faith, whether an injunction should issue at all,
and if so, on what terms and for what period in light of the whole record
to be adduced." 2 4 8
After the Holland case, it became very difficult to enjoin illegal
public employee strikes, particularly teacher strikes. As a result, the strike
became the motive power, particularly in education employee collective
bargaining. 249 But everything changed in 1994.
John Engler was elected governor in 1990, defeating a Democratic
incumbent, and re-elected in 1994, in part by demonizing the Michigan
Education Association ("MEA"). 250 Under Engler, Michigan abolished
property taxes for education and prohibited local school districts from
raising additional funding through millages.25 1 In signing such legislation,
Engler declared the end of "the power and control the teacher unions have
had over education policies ....
In 1994, Michigan enacted P.A. 112 which mandated fines of one
day's pay for each day a public education employee is on strike, prohibited
strikes over unfair labor practices and mandated that courts enjoin strikes
in public education.2 53 The Act also prohibited bargaining on the identity
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See Sch. Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 157 N.W.2d 206, 207 (Mich. 1968).
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id. at 211.
See William Lowe Boyd, David N. Plank & Gary Sykes, Teachers Unions in HardTimes,

in CONFLICTING MISSIONS? TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 174, 176 (Tom
Loveless ed., 2000) ("Between 1967 and 1980 there were 454 teachers' strikes against public school
districts in Michigan, an average of almost 35 a year.").

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 179
Id.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 423.202a (West 2016); but see,

Andrew Nickelhoff, Marching

Headlong into the Past: 1994 PA 112 and the Erosion of School Employee BargainingRights, 74
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of a school district's group insurance carrier, the starting day of the school
term and the amount of required pupil contact time, composition of sitebased decision-making bodies, decisions whether to provide interdistrict
or intradistrict open enrollment opportunities, the decision to operate a
charter school, the decision to contract out noninstructional support
services, the decision to use volunteers for any services, and decisions to
use instructional technology on a pilot basis.25 4
Contemporary media commentary suggests that the Act was a
backlash aimed primarily at the MEA.2 55 In urging support for the bill,
the Grand Rapids Press, editorialized that the MEA's
longstanding stranglehold on the bargaining process has
given Michigan teachers a Rolls-Royce health-insurance
plan, some of the highest school salaries in the country
and virtual immunity from the state law forbidding public
employee strikes. A consequence is that Michigan school
costs from 1980 through '92 rose an average of 8 percent
a year, with the difference being passed along to citizens
in their property-tax bills. 25 6
A stated rationale for restricting these subjects of bargaining was to
foreclose disputes over these subjects from creating impasses in
257
negotiations.
In 2011, Michigan expanded its list of prohibited subjects of
bargaining. It added to the list: placement of teachers; reductions in force
and recalls; performance evaluation systems; the development, content,
standards, procedures, adoption and implementation of a policy regarding
employee discharge or discipline; the format, timing and number of
classroom visits; the development, content, standards, procedures,
adoption and implementation of the method of employee compensation;
decisions about how an employee performance evaluation is used to

MICH. B. J. 1186 (1995) (explaining the requirement that courts automatically enjoin teacher strikes
was struck down as a breach of the separation of powers between the legislature and the courts and
apparently is now of no effect).

254.

Id. § 423.215(3)(a)-(h).

255. See, e.g., John Foren, Engler-GOPDriveto Cut School CostsAims at MEA, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Mar. 19, 1994, at Al; see also Boyd et al., supra note 248 at 176-77.
256. Senate's Turn on School Costs: House-passedBill Shfits Controlfrom MEA to Taxpayers,
Boards, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 19, 1994, at A8.

257. See Michael Matheson, Have Michigan PublicSchool Teachers Lost Their Ability to Strike
Under 1994 PA 112?, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 415, 430 (1998).
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determine performance-based compensation; and the development,
format, content and procedures of notice to parents and legal guardians of
pupils taught by a teacher who has been rated as ineffective. 2 5 8
Additionally, in 2011, Michigan prohibited, for all public employees, any
step increases after the collective bargaining agreement has expired,
required that following contract expiration and prior to reaching
agreement on a new contract employees bear all increases in costs of
health insurance and prohibited making increases in wages retroactive to
the expiration date of the prior contract.2 59
Sixty days prior to the expiration date of the collective bargaining
agreement, the parties are required to notify the Michigan Employment
Relations Commission ("MERC") of the status of their negotiations for a
successor agreement.260 Thirty days thereafter, MERC is required to
appoint a mediator, if one has not yet been appointed.2 61 Authority for
factfinding is found in the Michigan Labor Mediation Act ("MLMA"). 2 6 2
MERC Rules govern the appointment of a factfinder and the factfinding
process. 263 Police and firefighters have access to interest arbitration but
for all other public sector bargaining units, factfinding is the final impasse
resolution step available.264 Following receipt of the factfinder's
recommendations, the parties are required to meet at least once within
sixty days.265 When the parties have reached impasse, the employer may
implement its last best offer unilaterally.26 6
The model of collective bargaining in Michigan is in marked contrast
to the model under the Taylor Law. Under the Taylor Law, all provisions
of the expired contract remain in effect until a new agreement is reached,
step increases continue, and not even the legislative body may impose
terms that detract from employee rights under the expired agreement. In
Michigan, wages remain at the same level as in the expired agreement,
step increases are prohibited, employees are forced to bear the increases
in health insurance costs following expiration of the collective bargaining

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

H.R. 4628, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (codified at M.C.L.A.
H.R. 4152, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (codified at M.C.L.A.
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.207(2) (West 2018).
Id.
Id. § 423.25
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 423.131-423.138 (2018).

§ 432.215(3)(j)-(p)).
§ 432.215b).

264. MICH. EMP'T. REL. COMM'N., GUIDE TO PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN
MICHIGAN 9, 23 (2013).
265. Stephen 0. Schultz, Helen "Lizzie" Mills, & Steven L. Koski, Public-Sector Collective

Bargaining: Labor Relations in the Public Eye, 94 MICH. BAR J. 36, 38 (2015).
266. Id.; see, e.g., Kalkaska Cty. Rd Comm'n, 29 MPER 165 (2016).
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agreement, and agreements may not provide for wage increases to be
retroactive. The motive power in Michigan is employer power. Unions
are pressured to accept the employer's terms because the longer they go
beyond contract expiration without an agreement the worse off the
employees are and, although the union may initiate factfinding, the
employer may reject factfinder recommendations and unilaterally
implement anyway.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This exploration of different models with different motive power in
public sector collective bargaining developed policy issues that legislators
must confront in choosing among the models. Although they differ in
how they calibrate the balance between unions and employers in the
negotiations process, Florida and Michigan follow a model that relies on
factfimding and ultimate employer determination of terms and conditions
of employment to supply the motive power.267 The model was developed
by the Taylor Committee.
It does not provide for full collective
bargaining but relies on a lesser form of worker voice, what the Taylor
Committee called "collective negotiations," combined with stiff penalties
to prevent strikes while recognizing the supremacy of elected officials.
But, it ignores a major reason for public sector collective bargaining: that
with respect to their wages and working conditions, public employees are
at an inherent disadvantage in the general political process because they
are outnumbered by the users and purchasers of their services who want
more and better service at less cost. 2 6 8
New York and Pennsylvania rely on a freeze in the status quo
coupled with mediation as the motive power for collective bargaining.
Here too, the states differ on the precise calibration of power in the
bargaining process, but they both trade off lengthier negotiations due to
the absence of any source of urgency for reductions in strikes.269 In
contrast, Illinois and Ohio rely on the strike as the motive power and trade
off shorter negotiations for, depending on the political and economic

267. See supra Part V.
268. Of course, public employee collective bargaining legislation not only provides the union
with an avenue of access from which the general public is excluded, it also in many cases increases
the union's political power resulting from increased organization of employees and increased dues
revenues.
269. See supra Parts II.B, III (discussing how New York and Pennsylvania both trade off fewer
strikes for lengthier negotiations).

2018]

THE MOTIVE POWER

161

climate, potentially greater strike activity. 27 0 In states that rely on the
strike as the motive power, there is another policy tradeoff concerning
procedural requirements such as factfimding and mandatory strike
authorization votes, which reduce the number of strikes but make those
that occur more difficult to resolve. 7 1
The strongest inoculation against strikes is to mandate interest
arbitration.
However, interest arbitration has its own drawbacks,
depending on the type used. Evaluation of the different approaches to
interest arbitration is beyond the scope of this paper. It is noteworthy,
however, that most jurisdictions that mandate interest arbitration confine
the mandate to those employees, primarily police and firefighters, where
a strike has a great risk of disastrous consequences for public safety.

270.
271.

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV (discussing procedural requirements for strikes in Illinois and Ohio).

